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Abstract. Considering the wide spread adoption of smartphones in mo-
bile communications and the well established resource sharing use in
the networking community, we present a novel mechanism to achieve
anonymity in the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM).
We propose a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) infrastructure using
the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) where a smartphone registers on a
SIP Registrar and can start GSM conversation through another smart-
phone acting as a GSM gateway, by using a SIP Intermediate without
an extra cost. The testbed that we developed for empirical evaluation
revealed no signicant QoS degradation.
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1 Introduction and motivation
Resource sharing in community networks is a well established concept since the
dawn of the Internet. This has recently evolved through peer to peer networking,
to grid computing and nally to cloud computing services, as the benets of the
collective paradigm are non disputable.
In the meantime, the wide adoption and commercial success of mobile net-
works due to the advances of wireless communications has resulted to smart-
phone being the most preferred device for communicating through a variety of
platforms including email, social networking, messaging and so on.
Calls in the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) are very well
regulated. Users are bound to a mobile number according to a regulatory frame-
work and carriers are obliged to keep logs of their telephony conversations for
a period of up to two years (Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC). Carriers
? A preliminary version of this work has been presented at the 27th IFIP International
Information Security and Privacy Conference, Springer IFIP AICT, Greece, June
2012
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oer location based services because they are able to know and track the phone's
location. The GSMs encryption A5/1 algorithm is suering from a number of
vulnerabilities and some carriers have even preinstalled rootkits (Carrier IQ [1])
on the smartphones for debugging purposes as they claim. However the lack of
privacy is profound as the parties that oer the infrastructure, software, and op-
erating system are sharing information regarding the users location, preferences
and behavior.
In this paper we argue that certain privacy goals could be achieved by the
active participation and collaboration of a community of users. We focus on the
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and mobile communications and present
a proof of concept for performing telephone calls on a mobile network with
caller anonymity. The motivation behind the proposed framework is based on
the problem of providing caller anonymity where a caller's GSM provider may be
malicious and all other participants and nodes of the infrastructure are honest
but curious.
There is a number of examples where such a service would be really useful.
Totalitarian regimes and countries with limited civilian rights and such envi-
ronments call for privacy enhancing technologies, Tor1 being one of the most
popular. Government members or big rm executives are often victims of mo-
bile phone eavesdropping. Soldiers out of approach could form an ad hoc wireless
network and one of them acting as the Registrar can help others to communicate
through a voice network.
In addition to privacy, a new value added service is created as the participants
may also enjoy nancial gain due to the (mobile phone) at rate contract sharing
of the particular advantages.
It should be noted that in the context of this paper, caller anonymity re-
lates to the caller id and the call metadata; the underlying audio stream will
be susceptible to passive eavesdropping by the callee's provider. This paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 presents the related work on which our proposed
scheme draws upon. In Section 3 we present the proposed scheme and in Section
4 we report on some preliminary ndings after applying parts of the scheme on
our testbed. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 Related work
In our proposed scheme we make use of the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) as
the underlaying protocol for the VoIP infrastructure. Requirements and speci-
cations for oering caller anonymity over SIP are dened in RFC3323 [2] for
three use cases relating to withholding the identity from the intermediary parties,
the nal destination(s), or both.
Furthermore RFC3325 describes private extensions to the SIP that enable
a network of trusted SIP servers to assert the identity of authenticated users,
and the application of existing privacy mechanisms to the identity problem.
1 https://www.torproject.org/
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This is achieved by inserting a new header in SIP protocol named P-Preferred-
Identity [3]. However as RFC states the use of these extensions is only applicable
inside an administrative domain with previously agreed-upon policies for gener-
ation, transport and usage of such information which is not our case.
In [5], a ner granularity to the anonymity specications in a SIP context by
distinguishing the communicating intermediaries on the caller or callee providers
was added. In our proposed solution, there is a need to further elaborate on this
denition as the underlying communication environment involves two types of
infrastructures (namely the VoIP and the GSM environment). The principle
behind our proposed scheme is similar to that of crowds [4]. However the main
dierence is that in crowds anonymity is achieved by routing communication
randomly within a group of similar users whereas in our proposition we do not
allow direct communication between users and trac is routed through special
SIP protocol capable entities.
Quality of Service (QoS) is a critical factor that needs to be considered when
designing and deploying any kind of telephony communication. A prevalent QoS
feature for telephone communications is the delay [12], both while establishing
a session and, most importantly, during the actual session for the voice stream.
Other constraints include the guaranteed ordered arrival of the messages and the
unambiguity of the service agreements. These parameters aect signicantly the
choice of the appropriate privacy enhancing technology. In [5] the authors present
the main categories of PETs and conclude that a large number of technologies
cannot be integrated with a VoIP solution like SIP due to their negative impact
on the QoS attributes. For instance, Onion Routing [10] and Mixes [11] exhibit
high call delays, whereas Hordes [18], DC-Nets and pMixes [17] may be more
suitable but the latter has scalability issues as the underlying computational
cost is in O(n2). In addition, many technologies were not designed or imple-
mented with a view to be applied in VoIP communications (Onion Routing for
example) and as such they do not inherently support UDP which makes them
suitable only for the call initiation phases. Authors in [6] have proposed the
PrivaSIP1 and PrivaSIP2 protocols that are used to hide the Caller and Callee
IDs from intermediate untrusted SIP Proxies. They assume that both Caller's
and Callee's SIP Registrars have RSA capabilities. They use the public key of
the SIP Registrar in order to encrypt partial information in the "From" and the
"To" SIP headers respectively. In [7] the authors have extended their work to
use AES and elliptic curves. In case of the AES algorithm the key is derived
from the user's credentials. Our approach has the same result in the untrusted
network and it consumes less computational power as we replace every header
with the "Anonymous" keyword except from the "To" header that carries the
destination GSM phone number. However authentication between the SIP user
agent and the SIP Registrar is considered to lie within a trusted environment.
Finally authors in [8] adopt the MIST technique in a SIP environment achieving
in simulation low latency responses from their peers but the implementation is
tested only under special and limited conditions, such as within a 30 second
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duration call window. In addition, there is limited literature with respect to the
quality of the audio in the RTP stream.
Although users are familiar with the idea of sharing their computer resources,
this is not the case when it comes to sharing their smartphones. As new applica-
tions are developed phone sharing is expected to be a common issue in the near
future. An example of such application is xycall 2 which provides new means to
optimize communication in a peer-group and subsequently lower telephone bill in
the process.
3 The proposed scheme
The main idea behind the proposed scheme rests on the assumption that a
participant (or smartphone owner) is voluntarily willing to oer her equipment
for other users to make calls. This setting leads to two advantages. First, the
carrier would not be able to establish the identity of the real caller. Second,
there could be no charge at all if the oering person has a at rate contract
with the carrier. Clearly the success of the proposed scheme relies on ease of use,
reliability and level of participation in accordance to Metcalfe's Law [13].
The requirements and issues for a practical solution are summarized with the
following questions:
1. How can one discover users willing to oer their phones as SIP-GSM relays?
2. How can one discover the call destinations every user can oer, that is, with
which providers do they have an at rate contract?
3. How are the participating users protected by other, malicious participants?
In a resource sharing setting there may be a number of attacks aiming to
exploit an honest users contract.
4. How do I communicate with them?
Throughout the scheme the following roles and entities are identied:
 Caller : This role refers to the main beneciary of the infrastructure which
is the user that wishes to make a call to a user (callee) with a selective
preservation of her anonymity. Alice will be caller in our examples.
 Callee: The user that accepts a call. Bob will have this role.
 SIP-to-GSM gateway : The user that acts as a VoIP to GSM gateway and
shares her GSM service for a certain call session instance. In our scheme,
Carol will have this role.
 SIP Registrar : The registrars maintain the user SIP accounts and act as
back-to-back user agents [20]. We assume the trusted entities Registrar A
(for Alice) and Registrar C (for Carol).
 SIP Intermediate: Act as intermediaries on the communication path provid-
ing call routing. We assume a single SIP Intermediate entity in one of the
scenarios.
2 http://www.xycall.com/
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 GSM Carrier : This role oers the GSM mobile phone service. We assume
the entities GSM carrier A, C and B, for Alice, Carol and Bob respectively.
GSM Carrier A is assumed to be malicious and all other entities are assumed
to be honest but curious.
Denition 1. Honest-But-Curious (HBC): An honest-but-curious party (ad-
versary) [14] follows the prescribed protocol properly, but may keep intermediate
computation results, e.g. messages exchanged, and try to deduce additional in-
formation from them other than the protocol result.
Denition 2. Malicious Model: A malicious entity has no by default restric-
tions on what actions it can take; the entity may behave arbitrarily. It may for
example submit any value as input to the protocol or even abandon the protocol at
any step. See the denition given in [15] or the more detailed treatment in [16].
Fig. 1. The basic communication scenario
3.1 The anonymous communication scenario
Alice wants to communicate with Bob using her smartphone whilst maintaining
her anonymity from her carrier which is GSM Carrier A and Bobs carrier which
is GSM Carrier B and Carols carrier which is GSM Carrier C. More importantly,
the GSM carrier of Alice should not learn anything about this phone call.
Alice knows that a community of VoIP and GSM users is willing to help by
sharing their phone and credits from their contracts. The easiest way is to com-
municate with some appropriate member (Carol) of the community by using the
Internet infrastructure. Carol's device must be able to communicate with Alice
using the Internet through her Wireless Internet (WiFi) or High Speed Packet
Access (HSPA) connection and at the same time to call Bob using the GSM
connection; that is, Carol has to act as a bridge between these two connections
(Fig. 1).
This particular operation fullled by Carol (i.e., her smartphone) is a so-
called a SIP-to-GSM gateway operation and it is the core function for the service.
The operation has to take place without any actions taken from Carol apart from
her declaration of consent to lend her resources. This suggests a user registration
phase which is outlined later in this section.
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We must note that when Alice is accessing the network by a HSPA connection
an encrypted tunnel must be used. This is necessary to avoid a side channel
attack by Alice 's carrier.
We dene the following privacy requirements:
P1 Caller anonymity in the GSM network. Alice's identity should be hidden
from GSM carriers A, B and C.
P2 Mutual anonymity between the caller and the gateway. Alice should not know
that her call is routed through Carol and vice versa.
P3 SIP-to-GSM gateway privacy. The gateway's personal information, including
its contracts and capabilities should only be available to SIP Registrar C and
GSM carrier C.
P4 SIP Registrar privacy. There should be no leakage of the information main-
tained by the SIP registrars A and C.
The main entities, the important information items and the scope of each item,
that is, which entities have access to each item, are shown in Fig. 2.
Although in principle the caller's anonymity in the GSM environment can
be trivially oered due to the apparent \incompatibility" of the two networks,
the caller's identity could be discovered from the actual voice stream which
Bob's and Alice's GSM carriers B and C have access to. In general terms, this
is considered as a probabilistic side channel, since the probability of identifying
the caller from the available audio data is not necessarily equal to one. Since
audio data under current regulations is not stored by carriers, the disclosure of
Alice identity has to take place only during active calls.
The call metadata stored in the carriers' logles will not contribute to any
evidence revealing Alice's identity. Furthermore, mutual anonymity is also re-
quired between the caller and the gateway. Anonymity of the caller is required
because in the opposite case if Carol (the gateway) is malicious or a passive
eavesdropper or (even worse) belongs to the GSM carrier, then she will have
access to both the caller and the callee information. Therefore, P1 depends on
P2.
P3 is probably the most important requirement. All information provided by
the gateway needs to be protected as in the opposite case a curious participant
(e.g. another SIP Registrar) may collect valuable data and generate statistics
over the users and their contracts, which then can be used for personal gain.
P3 also depends upon P4. Since the SIP Registrar maintains user information,
if P4 is not oered, a curious participant may query a particular Registrar and
construct aggregate and statistical information about the users hosted by that
Registrar.
3.2 User registration
Each end user of the service will have two distinct roles, namely the Caller (which
will be using the SIP functionality), or the SIP2GSM gateway mentioned above.
We will refer to them as endpoint users of the SIP infrastructure.
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Fig. 2. The scope of each information item. Note that GSM Carrier A (apparently)
knows Alice but is not aware that she is making a phone call to a GSM phone. We also
assume that Honest-but-Curious users will not collaborate/share information. Every
green cell indicates that in our solution the corresponding data item (row) is visible
to the respective entity (column). The privacy requirements in cells indicate that the
corresponding data item should (P3,P4) or not (P1,P2) be visible to the respective
entity.
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Assume a working system that users want to get access to its services. End-
point users must rst obtain an account from a trusted SIP Registrar. A typical
registration process may involve visiting a website run by the SIP Registrar and
lling in an on-line application form with the necessary information for the ser-
vice to operate successfully. This application should consist of the following ve
sections:
User Registration Application Form
Section A1: \Personal Data"
- Username (e.g. email address) and a password for accessing their
account when they sign on and for updating their profile data.
- A valid email address to send a verification email in order to
enable the service.
- Credentials for the SIP network. The username and password
created here will be used when endpoint users set up their
smartphone sip2gsm application along with the SIP client program
in order to be authenticated by the SIP Registrar.
Section A2: \Network/Sharing Resources"
- GSM Carrier contract to share.
- UDP port to use for sip2gsm application.
Section A3: \Policy Data"
- Whitelist/blacklist for subscribers that endpoint users wish to
or do not allow to be called from their device.
- Time-schedule. A time table of the availability of their resources.
- Max call duration.
Section A4: \Security"
- The endpoint users should have the option to create a certificate
signed by the Trusted SIP Registrar Certificate Authority to support
Transport Layer Security (TLS) in case that encryption is needed for
the SIP signalling or the audio stream.
Section A5: \License Agreement"
- In this section the endpoint user is informed about the service levels
and that the application is offered as a public service.
Following the endpoint user registration, the data provided will allow the SIP
Registrar to create:
1. A SIP account for the SIP client application.
2. A SIP account for the sip2gsm operation.
3. The outgoing trunk for the specic carrier that is shared.
It is worth noting here the importance of the Section A2 parameters that
the user is declaring because on these values relies on the whole operation.
Each smartphone establishes two concurrent IP connections with the trusted
SIP Registrar. The rst connection is used by the SIP client application so as
the smartphone is capable to make a call and the second connection is necessary
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for the sip2gsm application in order to forward the call to the GSM network.
Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Two concurrent IP connections for each smartphone.
In addition the SIP Registrar will update the outbound route for the spe-
cic carrier with the new trunk member when the endpoint user is in service.
This operation will be continuously updated as endpoint users are expected to
continuously enter and leave the network.
SIP registrars are assumed to be trusted and to act as agents on behalf of
the users. As back-to-back user agents, the registrars operate between the end
points of the voice session during the phone calls. The general privacy assumption
here is that the user may trust its Registrar but should not be obliged to trust
other registrars or SIP Intermediates. It is the user's Registrar's responsibility to
protect the user's personal data including her capabilities from curious or even
malicious participants who could try to collect statistics on user carrier contract
data.
3.3 Trusted SIP Registrar and SIP Intermediates
As noted above a user trusts a SIP Registrar for providing their data and ob-
taining an account. Every SIP Registrar in turn needs to be aliated with at
least one SIP Intermediate server. The process is described below.
The aliation is initiated with the SIP Registrar administrator who will
provide the following data to the SIP Intermediate server during the application
process:
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SIP Registrar Application Form
Section R1: \Personal Data"
- Username (the email address of the administrator) and a password for
accessing their account when they sign on to update their profile data.
- A valid email address where verification email will be send in order to
enable the service.
- Credentials for the SIP network. The username and password
created here will be used when administrators build their trunks to the
SIP Intermediate server in order to be authenticated by the SIP service.
Section R2: \Network/Sharing Resources"
- GSM Carriers that trusted SIP registrars can route calls to.
- UDP port to use for sip2sip peering.
- Landline numbers that trusted SIP registrars can route calls to.
Section R3: \Policy Data"
- Whitelist/blacklist for subscribers that SIP Registrar does or not
accepts calls.
- Time-schedule. A time table of the availability of their resources
Section R4: \security"
- Enable encryption or not (TLS)
Section R5: \License Agreement"
- In this section the SIP Registrar Administrator is informed on the
service levels and liabilities of the SIP Intermediate offered as a
public service.
Following the data provided by the administrator, the SIP Intermediate will
create:
1. A SIP account for SIP Registrar peering.
2. New trunks for the carrier networks that SIP Registrars can route calls to.
Lastly, the SIP Intermediate Server will update the outbound route directory
for the specic carriers that the new trunk member can serve. This update
operation will be regularly performed as trunks are expected to continuously
enter and leave the network. The operation of the outbound route directory of
the SIP Intermediate Server is similar to the routing table of a router.
3.4 Baseline case: mutually trusted registrars
We initially setup a testbed consisting of two registrars. In the baseline sce-
nario we assumed that the registrars are mutually trusted in the sense that the
gateway's Registrar will have knowledge of the caller's Registrar (but not the
caller's ID as there is no reason to disclose this piece of information). This setting
is presented in Fig. 4 whereas the corresponding communication messages and
sequence are presented in the diagram in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 4. Mutually trusted registrars
The 401 Unauthorized message is noteworthy; this is triggered because the
rst SIP INVITE is unauthenticated and is part of the connection process ow.
The sequence of two SIP INVITE messages can be utilised for intrusion detection
purposes, as this pattern describes a legitimate request.
In terms of the stated privacy requirements, the above setting can partially
meet P1 through P3. This can be achieved if the capabilities discovery process is
executed between the registrars and without disclosing the caller's and gateway's
identity. For example, Alice, maintaining a contract with Carrier A wishes to call
a user who is with Carrier B. Alice's Registrar will issue a request \Who has flat
rates with carrier B?" and will receive an answer from Carol's Registrar of a
type \I have a user(s) with a contract with B". Carol's Registrar could
also create a temporary pseudonym of Carol to assist future identication of the
resource and speed up the subsequent process steps.
Due to the presence of direct communication between registrars, requirement
P4 cannot be met unless some sophisticated cryptographic protocol is used.
What follows in the next section is a proposal for achieving Registrar privacy
and further strengthening P3.
3.5 Private VoIP to GSM gateway discovery
A fully developed version of our system will have to address additional privacy
issues that arise in auxiliary functions of the system. An example is the gateway
discovery procedure discussed earlier. If the SIP Registrar A is trusted (as we
assumed earlier) then the privacy of Alice is preserved while requesting to use
the platform for a call to Bob. Similarly, if the Registrar C of Carol is trusted
then Carol can safely advertise her readiness to act as SIP-to-GSM gateway for
specic GSM carriers. The above scheme can be further improved by adding
a SIP Intermediate server to it. However, in all these cases, privacy relies on
assumptions about the participating entities and/or the introduction of a SIP
Intermediate. A challenging requirement would be to solve the same problem
for Honest-but-Curious or even Malicious entities, by applying advanced cryp-
tographic techniques. For example, in [21] the authors present a cryptographic
protocol for privacy-preserving service discovery in ubiquitous computing en-
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Fig. 5. VoIP to GSM call sequence
vironments. We are currently examining a similar service for the needs of our
application.
Fig. 6. The testbed environment
3.6 Testbed develpment
We implemented the proposed framework and conducted a series of experiments.
We used two CentOS servers with Asterisk 3 software as SIP Registrar entities,
3 Asterisk is a popular software implementation of a telephone private branch exchange
(PBX).
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a third Asterisk server as the SIP Intermediate Server and a VoIP Analog Tele-
phony Adaptor (Linksys SPA3000) with Fixed Cellural Terminal from Ericsson
as VoIP-to-GSM gateway (Fig. 6) simulating the application to be developed for
smartphones. The initial caller (Alice) was an Android smartphone running the
CSipSimple SIP application.
The main dierence between the new framework and the one we presented
in our earlier work [22] is the replacement of the TekSIP Proxy Server with
another Asterisk server as SIP Intermediate. This choice gives us the ability
to manipulate SIP Headers in order to eliminate information leakage regarding
identity and to signicantly improve performance.
The RFC3323 [2] states that SIP entities (intermediates or proxies) add head-
ers on their own that they could reveal information about the originator of a
message; for example, a Via4 header might reveal the service provider through
whom the user sends requests, which might in turn strongly hint at the user's
identity to some recipients. RFC states also that the following SIP headers, when
generated by a user agent, can directly or indirectly reveal identity information
about the originator of a message: From, Contact, Reply-To, Via, Call-Info,
User-Agent, Organization, Server, Subject, Call-ID, In-Reply-To and Warning.
The same may occur during the authentication procedure.
Since we use trusted SIP registrars that act as back to back user agents
it is safer to strip o this kind of information before forwarding the message
to SIP intermadiate server than expecting from each user agent not to reveal
such information. In particular special modications were taken into the SIP
Registrars and the SIP Intermediate Server's congurations les to accomplish
that.
For the data collection we used a 2960G Gigabit Cisco switch with port
monitoring enabled. For analyzing the SIP negotiation (Fig. 7) we used the voip
telephony analysis tool from Wireshark software5.
From the call ow and the SIP request methods it can be seen that Bob is
unaware of the initial caller. None of the entities has full knowledge of the path
of communication. If we look carefully at SIP headers of the second (authorized)
SIP INVITE request in (Fig. 7) identity information regarding Alice has been
revealed. Below is the full listing of the SIP INVITE request.
4 The Via header is used to record the SIP route taken by a request and is used to
route a response back to the originator.
5 Wireshark is a free and open-source network packet analyzer.
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Session Initiation Protocol
Request-Line: INVITE SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.duth.gr SIP/2.0
Method: INVITE
Request-URI: SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.duth.gr
Request-URI User Part: 6977xxxxxx
Request-URI Host Part: xxx.xxx.duth.gr
[Resent Packet: False]
Message Header
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP xxx.xxx.134.23:60500;rport;
branch=z9hG4bKPjMkNs9jzvJ2NFDbVYcl86o2MsngtkuRrH
Transport: UDP
Sent-by Address: xxx.xxx.134.23
Sent-by port: 60500
RPort: rport
Branch: z9hG4bKPjMkNs9jzvJ2NFDbVYcl86o2MsngtkuRrH
Max-Forwards: 70
From: <SIP:604@xxx.xxx.duth.gr>;tag=KmMGFHZqxgOvEiItn-JEkU47eyXhqmzq
SIP from address: SIP:604@xxx.xxx.duth.gr
SIP from address User Part: 604
SIP from address Host Part: xxx.xxx.duth.gr
SIP tag: KmMGFHZqxgOvEiItn-JEkU47eyXhqmzq
To: <SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.duth.gr>
SIP to address: SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.duth.gr
SIP to address User Part: 6977xxxxxx
SIP to address Host Part: xxx.xxx.duth.gr
Contact: <SIP:604@xxx.xxx.134.23:60500;ob>
Contact-URI: SIP:604@xxx.xxx.134.23:60500;ob
Contactt-URI User Part: 604
Contact-URI Host Part: xxx.xxx.134.23
... ommitted for brevity
User-Agent: CSipSimple r1108 / E10i
Authorization: Digest username="604", realm="Asterisk",
nonce="1be6b04e", uri="SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.duth.gr",
response="cbb7187f375ee94ec625cae946c4be41", algorithm=MD5
Authentication Scheme: Digest
username="604"
realm="Asterisk"
nonce="1be6b04e"
uri="SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.duth.gr"
response="cbb7187f375ee94ec625cae946c4be41"
algorithm=MD5
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: 367
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Message Body
Session Description Protocol
Session Description Protocol Version (v): 0
Owner/Creator, Session Id (o): - 3551550501 3551550501
IN IP4 xxx.xxx.134.23
Owner Username: -
Session ID: 3551550501
Session Version: 3551550501
Owner Network Type: IN
Owner Address Type: IP4
Owner Address: xxx.xxx.134.23
Session Name (s): pjmedia
Connection Information (c): IN IP4 xxx.xxx.134.23
Connection Network Type: IN
Connection Address Type: IP4
Connection Address: xxx.xxx.134.23, lines ommitted.
It is worth mentioning that we have three major disclosures regarding Alice.
We can learn the username and the userid that she uses when registering to
Registrar A which is \604". Both dataitems are reported in several elds in many
SIP headers but especially in Authorization: Digest username=\604". We can
also learn the application she is using to make phone calls. This information is
in header User-Agent: CSipSimple r1108 / E10i-7. The name of the application
is CSipSimple with revision r1108. Even more interesting is the fact that we can
learn the make and model number of smartphone E10i-7 that Alice is using.
That model number leads us to the commercial name \Sony Ericsson Xperia
X10 mini". From Session Description Protocol (SDP) and Session Name header
we can learn that the application is using the \pjmedia"6 media stack for the
audio stream. Finally from the Authorization header and the realm value we can
learn that Alice's Registrar is based on Asterisk PBX software.
We proceeded to the appropriate modications in Registrar's A conguration
so as to block any information leakage regarding Alice and the server itself. All
packets that are sent from Registrar A to the SIP Intermediate are sanitized
of sensitive information. Even better all possible values that can reveal iden-
tity information has been removed or replaced with \Anonymous" keyword or
\anonymous.invalid" domain as RFC 3323 suggests. This can be seen in detail
in the following listing which refers to the SIP INVITE method from Registrar
A to SIP Intermediate.
6 http://www.pjsip.org/pjmedia/docs/html/
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Session Initiation Protocol
Request-Line: INVITE SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.125.93 SIP/2.0
Method: INVITE
Request-URI: SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.125.93
Request-URI User Part: 6977xxxxxx
Request-URI Host Part: xxx.xxx.125.93
[Resent Packet: False]
Message Header
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP xxx.xxx.114.199:5060;branch=z9hG4bK7f15f6cb
Transport: UDP
Sent-by Address: xxx.xxx.114.199
Sent-by port: 5060
Branch: z9hG4bK7f15f6cb
Max-Forwards: 70
From: "Anonymous" <SIP:Anonymous@anonymous.invalid>;tag=as6fe34fdf
SIP Display info: "Anonymous"
SIP from address: SIP:Anonymous@anonymous.invalid
SIP from address User Part: Anonymous
SIP from address Host Part: anonymous.invalid
SIP tag: as6fe34fdf
To: <SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.125.93>
SIP to address: SIP:6977xxxxxx@xxx.xxx.125.93
SIP to address User Part: 6977xxxxxx
SIP to address Host Part: xxx.xxx.125.93
Contact: <SIP:Anonymous@xxx.xxx.114.199:5060>
Contact-URI: SIP:Anonymous@xxx.xxx.114.199:5060
Contactt-URI User Part: Anonymous
Contact-URI Host Part: xxx.xxx.114.199
Contact-URI Host Port: 5060
Call-ID: 10362e2467bc0bfc77e2a11d1a39c048@anonymous.invalid
CSeq: 102 INVITE
Sequence Number: 102
Method: INVITE
User-Agent: Anonymous
Date: Tue, 17 Jul 2012 21:48:23 GMT
Allow: ... ommitted for brevity
Session Description Protocol
Session Description Protocol Version (v): 0
Owner/Creator, Session Id (o): Anonymous 372877586 372877586
IN IP4 xxx.xxx.114.199
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Owner Username: Anonymous
Session ID: 372877586
Session Version: 372877586
Owner Network Type: IN
Owner Address Type: IP4
Owner Address: xxx.xxx.114.199
Session Name (s): Anonymous
Connection Information (c): IN IP4 xxx.xxx.114.199
Connection Network Type: IN
Connection Address Type: IP4
Connection Address: xxx.xxx.114.199
Bandwidth Information (b): .... ommitted for brevity
Alike SIP Invite requests are produced from SIP Intermediate Server as well
as Registrar C.
3.7 Performance evaluation
Telephony applications require real time audio streaming and are tightly coupled
with QoS network parameters. We therefore need to investigate whether the
proposed solution with the added security controls will not have negative impact
on the user acceptance.
We performed a stress test to our framework with varying number of concur-
rent connections using the sipp7 application. We ran a number of incremental
concurrent calls with each call having duration of 20 secs. The tests stopped
when we reached the total number of 100 calls. From the results (Fig. 8) in can
be seen that the call on the SIP side, with one SIP Intermediate the majority
of the calls can be established within a period of 400 ms wich is less than the
500 ms delay (Fig. 9) we achieved in the previous testbed [22]. It is noteworthy
that it was now possible to reach the number of 60 concurrent (in previous test
we reached 50 concurrent) calls before the system started dropping calls at 10
percent rate.
In all experiments the SIP transaction delay compared to the GSM call es-
tablishment delay which is in the order of 8-12 seconds, is insignicant.
In the following graphs we can see the resources impact of such SIP infras-
tructure to the computer system that hosted Registrar A. It is very clear that
the proposed scheme is mainly CPU intensive (Fig. 10) while disk (Fig. 11),
network (Fig. 13) and memory (Fig. 12) usage is less aected.
4 Concluding remarks and areas for future research
We have described a framework for providing caller anonymity from their GSM
carriers by utilizing a resource based community of VoIP infrastructure that
7 http://sipp.sourceforge.net/. SIPp is a free Open Source test tool / trac generator
for the SIP protocol.
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used SIP as a means to identify the issues and explore possible design and im-
plementation alternatives. Following our empirical investigation, we concluded
that adding such an infrastructure to a GSM network will not cause any signif-
icant delays in the call establishment, as the bottleneck remains on the GSM
side.
Currently, one of the weaknesses the proposed framework has is the ability
to perform eavesdropping on the SIP network since it lacks encryption. This
ongoing area of research is twofold requiring eective encryption algorithms but
also suitable ones in terms of network eciency, systems load and quality of
service.
Another area of research is in the development of a protocol so that each af-
liated Registrar advertises its network routing capabilities to the aliated SIP
Intermediate in a dynamic way. Framework parameters must be tuned accord-
ingly such as registration intervals, audio codecs to be used and SIP OPTIONS
method update interval to succeed in optimizing performance.
This community based resource scheme can be expanded with resources such
home PSTN lines with at rates or even home wireless access points. Account-
ability issues may arise with large number of community members oering their
resources and mechanisms such as SIPA+ [23] may apply.
As this proposed solution is dened over a novel conguration of a hetero-
geneous network, further security analysis of relevant threat vectors and corre-
sponding countermeasures must be conducted. For example, a VoIP bot run-
ning on the proposed infrastructure could make excessive resource allocation
and as such an antispam over Internet Telephony mechanism must be deployed
[19]. Lastly, legal issues must be looked into when oering such a service in
public and their compliance to the respective legislation and the related di-
rectives like the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), the ePrivacy Directive
(2002/58/EC), the regulatory framework on electronics communications by the
Citizen's Rights Directive (2009/136/EC) and nally the Data Retention Direc-
tive (2006/24/EC).
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Fig. 8. Response Time Repartition for 100 calls using Asterisk as SIP Intermediate
Fig. 9. Response Time Repartition for 100 calls using TekSIP Proxy
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Fig. 10. Registar A - Very signicant increase in CPU utilization during stress tests
Fig. 11. Registar A - Small increase in disk usage during stress tests
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Fig. 12. Registar A - Small increase in memory usage during tests
Fig. 13. Registar A - Signicant increase in network utilization during stress tests
